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NOTE
Corporate Transparency and the First Amendment:
Compelled Disclosures in the Wake of National
Association of Manufacturers v. SEC
Imagine you have purchased a brand new smartphone. And, as an
especially savvy and politically cognizant consumer, you are interested in
finding out where your new smartphone comes from. Given news coverage
regarding unethically sourced products—from child labor in China to the
rise of the fair trade coffee movement in South America—your concern is
not novel. 1
It would probably be valuable to know that the core components that go
into constructing electronics like your new smartphone—tungsten, tin, gold,
and tantalum—are often sourced from the war-torn region of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”). 2 You might also be
interested to know that armed militias often monopolize the mines that
produce these minerals so they can sell minerals to U.S. companies and
finance their civil war, which has now been raging for more than two
decades. 3 The war that they are financing just so happens to be one of the
bloodiest conflicts in world history, characterized by extreme levels of
gender-specific violence. 4 Unfortunately, browsing the website of your new
smartphone’s manufacturer, you find no information on the sources of their
electronics. In fact, a recent circuit court decision has affirmatively
protected the rights of companies like your smartphone manufacturer to
omit this information from their websites under the First Amendment. 5
Would you still purchase the same smartphone if you knew that, just by
purchasing its core components, you could be indirectly funding a
humanitarian crisis? If this information would alter your purchasing
1. See, e.g., David Barboza, Despite a Pledge by Samsung, Child Labor Proves
Resilient, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/business/
international/children-found-working-at-samsung-supplier-in-china.html; Alison Benjamin,
Fair Dunk'em, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/
feb/09/food.fairtrade.
2. See What Are Conflict Minerals?, SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, http://www.source
intelligence.com/what-are-conflict-minerals/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
3. See Eastern Congo, ENOUGH PROJECT, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/
eastern_congo (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
4. See id.
5. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM III), 800 F.3d 518, 519–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015),
reh’g en banc denied, No. 13-5252 (Nov. 9, 2015).
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decisions, you might find the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Securities Exchange
Commission (“NAM III”) unsettling.
In August 2015, a panel of three judges on the D.C. Circuit Court in
NAM III decided that the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”)’s
rule requiring companies to publish whether their minerals have been found
to be “DRC conflict free” on their websites violated the First Amendment
rights of corporations. 6 The SEC promulgated this rule following the
express mandate of section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 7 Although
compelled commercial disclosures have long been an accepted and even
favored method of regulation, recent First Amendment challenges have cast
doubt upon how heavily the government may rely on this method to
encourage corporate transparency in publicly traded U.S. companies. 8
Depending on the type of compelled speech at issue, courts have applied
varying levels of scrutiny to cases challenging the constitutionality of
compelled disclosures. Speech compelled for purposes of avoiding
consumer deception and disclosures of purely factual information enjoy a
relatively low level of scrutiny, subject only to a rational basis inquiry.
However, the D.C. Circuit Court found that conflict minerals disclosures
fall outside this realm of lax scrutiny; the court instead applied a more
exacting level of scrutiny to strike down these disclosures. 9
To put it simply, the D.C. Circuit Court got it wrong. The court
unnecessarily deviated from its own precedent—decided scarcely over a
year before NAM III—in which it extended the application of rational basis
scrutiny to a wider array of cases, under the justification that a company’s
constitutional interest in avoiding government-compelled disclosure of
purely factual and uncontroversial information is minimal. 10 The court
improperly narrowed the scope of that prior decision in holding that rational
basis scrutiny applies only to advertising material, it misplaced reliance on
finding proof that the SEC’s regulation would in fact prove efficacious in
alleviating the conflict in the DRC, and it found that the disclosures

6. Id.
7. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249, & 249b); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (2012).
8. See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 541–43 (2012).
9. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 521–24.
10. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (AMI), 760 F.3d 18, 22-23 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
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required did not convey purely factual information. With its decision, the
D.C. Circuit overlooked the negative consequences of its decision on
consumers, U.S. policy, and the state of compelled commercial disclosures
as a whole. Although the SEC recently decided not to pursue further appeal
of the NAM III decision, 11 this case widens the circuit split regarding the
level of scrutiny that applies to government-compelled disclosures, and its
missteps ought to be considered when these issues appear before sister
circuit courts.
Consumers deserve to be able to make informed decisions with regard to
the products they purchase. In light of the extreme brutality in the DRC and
the urgency with which ameliorating steps must be taken, it is imperative
that the U.S. government be afforded the ability to use the SEC’s disclosure
regime to encourage corporate transparency.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides the factual background
behind the conflict minerals crisis in the DRC and the enactment of section
1502 and the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule. Part II traces compelled
commercial speech law prior to the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision. Part III
discusses the litigation surrounding the National Association of
Manufacturers’ constitutional challenge to section 1502 and the D.C.
Circuit Court’s ultimate decision that requiring companies to publish
whether or not their conflict minerals have been found to be “DRC conflict
free” on their websites violates the First Amendment rights of corporations.
Finally, Part IV emphasizes the broad impact of the D.C. Circuit Court’s
decision and highlights the major flaws in the majority’s unsound ruling
striking down the Conflict Minerals Rule.
I. Introduction to the Conflict Minerals Crisis in the DRC
and Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
A. The DRC Civil War and Conflict Minerals Crisis
The DRC has never been a stranger to civil war and corruption. Armed
groups fighting in the region are eager to capture the vast mineral wealth of
the country. 12 However, the most recent conflict, spurred by the 1997
incursion of Rwandan militias aimed at eradicating extremist Hutu forces,
has become the center of what some observers have called “Africa’s world

11. Cory Hester, SEC Accepts Ruling That Part of Conflicts Minerals Rule Violates
Free Speech, WESTLAW CAP. MKTS. DAILY BRIEFING (Apr. 13, 2016), 2016 WL 1442370.
12. DR Congo Country Profile, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa13283212 (last updated Apr. 11, 2017).
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war.” 13 This war has become the world’s deadliest conflict since World
War II. 14 It has produced 5.4 million deaths, a death toll as catastrophic as
the U.S. Civil War, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War, combined. 15
Beyond mere death toll, however, this conflict has spawned some of the
most notorious human rights atrocities the world has ever seen.16 The
conflict in the DRC is characterized by extreme levels of violence,
particularly sexual and gender-based violence, which has risen to the level
of an extreme humanitarian crisis in the region.17
“Conflict minerals,” including tantalum, tin, gold, and tungsten,18 are at
the center of the DRC crisis. Militant groups have capitalized upon the
natural resource-rich nature of the region, largely financing themselves by
taking control of local mines and exploiting the mineral trade. 19 After these
minerals are extracted from the mines, they can be sold through several
intermediaries before ultimately being purchased by large, multinational
companies. 20 U.S. companies typically purchase conflict minerals for use in
manufacturing various products, including electronics, automobiles, and
sports equipment. 21 Companies in the mineral extraction industry indirectly
finance these armed groups by purchasing minerals from militant-controlled
mines. 22
B. Passage of Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Conflict
Minerals Rule
The United States has consistently made alleviating the crisis in the DRC
a high priority, and in doing so has recognized the necessity for U.S.
companies conducting business operations in the DRC region to exercise
proper due diligence in determining the supply and chain of custody of

13. Id.
14. Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, § 101(7), 120 Stat. 3384, 3385; DR Congo Country Profile,
supra note 12.
15. What Are Conflict Minerals?, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R
43639, CONFLICT MINERALS AND RESOURCE EXTRACTION: DODD-FRANK, SEC REGULATIONS,
AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 1 (2015).
18. 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249(b) (2015).
19. Conflict Minerals, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/
content/conflict-minerals (last visited Apr. 15, 2017).
20. See id.
21. What Are Conflict Minerals?, supra note 2.
22. Conflict Minerals, supra note 19.
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conflict minerals.23 In 2006, Congress enacted the Democratic Republic of
the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006,
pledging “to make all efforts to ensure that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . is committed to responsible and
transparent management of natural resources across the country.” 24
In order to further facilitate this goal of transparency in the mineral
extraction industry, Congress added section 1502 to the Dodd-Frank Act. 25
Section 1502 mandates that the SEC promulgate rules requiring publicly
traded companies to conduct due diligence in determining the origins of
their minerals and to submit reports to the SEC regarding whether those
minerals have been determined to be “DRC conflict free.”26 After multiple
rounds of soliciting commentary and developing proposed rules, the SEC
adopted its final rule on August 22, 2012 (the “Conflict Minerals Rule,” or,
the “Rule”). 27
The Conflict Minerals Rule outlines a three-step process: First, the
company must decide if it is covered by the Rule.28 The Rule only applies
to publicly traded companies for which conflict minerals are necessary to
the functionality or production of a product manufactured or contracted to
be manufactured by that company. 29 If the company is covered by the Rule,
the second step requires the company to conduct a reasonable country of
origin inquiry regarding their minerals.30 The third and final step depends
on the results of the county or origin inquiry. If the results of this inquiry
reveal that the company either knows or has reason to believe that its
minerals originated in the DRC or an adjoining country, the company must
exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of
their conflict minerals.31 If, after due diligence, the company determines
that its minerals did not originate in the covered countries, it still must
23. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement Concerning Implementation of
Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Legislation Concerning Conflict Minerals Due Diligence
(July 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/168851.pdf.
24. Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-456, § 102(8), 120 Stat. 3384, 3386.
25. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
26. Id.
27. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,277–79, 56,365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, & 249b).
28. See id. at 56,285, 56,287.
29. Id. at 56,287–98.
30. Id. at 56,310–16.
31. Id. at 56,316–17, 56,320-21.
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prepare and submit a form to the SEC describing its due diligence efforts.32
The company may then refer to those minerals as “DRC conflict free.”33 If,
on the other hand, the company reveals that its minerals did originate in the
covered countries (or it cannot determine whether its minerals originated in
the covered countries), the company must prepare and submit a Conflict
Minerals Report to the SEC. 34 Those minerals must be referred to as having
“not been found to be 'DRC conflict free.'” 35
Once the three-step process is complete, the Conflict Minerals Rule
requires that companies publish their reports on their public websites. 36
There is, however, no requirement that the information be placed on any
physical labeling of the product itself.37
The National Association of Manufacturers and other organizations
challenged section 1502 and the Conflicts Mineral Rule alleging, among
other things, that the required publishing of SEC disclosures on company
websites constitutes unconstitutionally compelled corporate speech. 38
II. Compelled Commercial Speech
In order to better understand the legal landscape in which section 1502
and the Conflict Minerals Rule operate, a brief overview of compelled
commercial speech is necessary. Government-compelled speech is a
pervasive component of U.S. consumer culture. One can find required
disclosures on nearly any product, from cigarettes and medications to
automobiles and electronics. Further, publicly traded companies are
required to make an expansive host of disclosures to the SEC regarding
various elements of their products. 39 However, while there has been a great
deal of analysis broadly pronouncing the right of private individuals to be
free from compelled speech, judicial guidance on the matter of compelled
speech in the commercial realm is scant. 40
In 1976, the Supreme Court first announced the right of commercial
speech to enjoy First Amendment protection in its Virginia State Board of
32. Id. at 56,313.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 56,281.
36. Id. at 56,315–16.
37. See id. at 56,323.
38. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM II), 748 F.3d 359, 362–65 (D.C. Cir. 2014),
overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
39. NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
40. Keighly, supra note 8, at 541.
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Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. decision. 41 In doing
so, the Court recognized that the “consumer's interest in the free flow of
commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate.” 42 However, even though
the Court granted First Amendment protection to commercial speech, the
Court was careful to note that regulations of commercial speech may be
afforded a “different degree of protection,” based on the need to “insure
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired.” 43
The first case to firmly illustrate the degree of protection afforded to
commercial speech was Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York. 44 In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
provided a four-part test for analyzing government regulations of
commercial speech: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and must
not be misleading, (2) the asserted governmental interest must be
substantial, (3) the regulation must directly advance the governmental
interest asserted, and (4) the regulation must not be more extensive than is
necessary to serve the interest. 45 Courts generally accept that this test
represents a type of intermediate scrutiny applied in the context of
commercial speech regulations. 46
Following Central Hudson, the Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio relaxed the requirements
for regulations on compelled commercial speech.47 In Zauderer, the Court
applied a rational basis standard for compelled commercial speech, noting
that while the commercial speech is still afforded First Amendment
protections, that protection is lesser than what is required for what the Court
deems “noncommercial speech.” 48 The Zauderer Court stated that “an
advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers.” 49 The Court further emphasized that an
advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing any
41. 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).
42. Id. at 763.
43. Id. at 771 n.24.
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45. Id. at 566.
46. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 372 (D.C. Circuit 2014), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
47. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
48. Id. at 637.
49. Id. at 651.
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particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”50 However,
though Zauderer provided a relaxed approach to regulations of
government-compelled commercial speech, the language of the case is less
than clear as to the scope of this rational basis approach, including what
“types” of compelled commercial speech trigger the Zauderer rational basis
analysis. 51 This remains an open question, and circuit courts across the
country use very different methods of attempting to answer it.52
III. The National Association of Manufacturers Decisions
Against the backdrop of this uncertain legal landscape surrounding
government-compelled speech, the D.C. Circuit Court was tasked with
considering a constitutional challenge to the Conflict Minerals Rule’s
requirement that disclosures be posted on a company’s public website.
A. Procedural History and the American Meat Institute Decision
While this Note primarily concerns the D.C. Circuit Court’s August 2015
ruling in NAM III, that decision is the culmination of a long and twisting
history of constitutional challenges to the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule,53
which highlights the uncertainty that plagues the realm of compelled
disclosure regulation.
Shortly after the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule took effect, the National
Association of Manufacturers, alongside the Business Roundtable, and the
United States Chamber of Commerce (collectively, “the Manufacturers”),
filed suit in a D.C. District Court to challenge the constitutionality of the
Conflict Minerals Rule’s directives. 54 The Manufacturers alleged, among
other things, that the statute and Rule violated the Constitution’s First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech by requiring a company to
publish on its own website that its products are “not DRC conflict free,”
even when the company is simply unable to trace its supply chains to
50. Id.
51. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny when Zauderer is found inapplicable); Entm’t Software
Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny when video
labeling requirements were found to be outside of the Zauderer exception).
52. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 559-60 n.8; Entm’t Software Ass’n, 469 F.3d at 652.
53. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC (NAM I), 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d
in part, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); NAM II, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by
AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); NAM III, 800 F.3d
518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
54. See NAM I, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
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determine the minerals’ origins. 55 The Manufacturers complained that this
requirement forces a company to falsely associate itself with groups
involved in human rights violations.56
Importantly, although the Manufacturers challenged many aspects of the
Conflict Minerals Rule, during the course of trial the Manufacturers
confirmed that the only portion of the Rule they challenged under the First
Amendment was the requirement that companies publish the conflict
minerals sourcing information on their own websites. 57 Thus, the
companies essentially conceded that the Rule’s requirement that they
conduct due diligence procedures in order to produce a disclosure report to
the SEC was fully within the government’s authority to compel. 58
In response to the Manufacturer’s allegations, the district court held that
the statute and the Conflict Minerals Rule withstood all of the constitutional
challenges and did not violate First Amendment rights of companies.59
Notably, this court refused to apply the relaxed Zauderer standard,
interpreting it to only apply in cases of consumer deception.60 Instead, the
district court applied the stricter Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test,
and still found that the Rule passed constitutional muster.61
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
Conflict Minerals Rule did, in fact, violate the First Amendment rights of
companies dealing in conflict minerals. 62 The court of appeals agreed with
the district court that the Zauderer test was not the appropriate standard of
review. 63 This time, however, the court invalidated the Rule under the third
prong of the Central Hudson test, finding that the Rule was not narrowly
tailored. 64 The Rule failed this prong because, in the court’s eyes, the SEC
did not prove that less restrictive means would fail in advancing the
government interest of promoting peace and security in the DRC. 65 The
court proposed some means of accomplishing the interest of corporate
transparency that it found less restrictive, including allowing the SEC to
55. Id. at 53.
56. See id. at 73.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 81–82.
60. Id. at 76–77.
61. Id. at 78–80.
62. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
63. Id. at 372.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 372–73.
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analyze the companies’ disclosure reports and compile its own, centralized
list of which products have been found to be “DRC conflict free.” 66
Because the SEC had failed to provide sufficient evidence that such means
would fail, the court struck down the Rule’s requirement that companies
denote whether their conflict minerals are “DRC conflict free” on their own
company websites as a First Amendment violation. 67
This was not the end of the road for the Conflict Minerals Rule,
however. In his concurring opinion, Judge Srinivasan noted that a similarly
situated case was pending before the D.C. Circuit Court, and suggested the
NAM II court hold off in deciding whether the Zauderer standard could be
extended to cover the SEC disclosures until that decision came out.68 That
intervening decision was American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture (“AMI”). 69
AMI involved a First Amendment challenge to country-of-origin labeling
requirements on meat products.70 The American Meat Institute challenged
disclosures required on the packaging of meat products relating to where
the animals used in the products were born and slaughtered. 71 The purpose
of these disclosures was to aid consumers in making informed decisions
when purchasing meat products and was not related to curing alleged
consumer deception. 72 The AMI court recognized the extent of the
confusion among the courts regarding the breadth of the Zauderer standard,
and took the task of answering the question of “whether the principles
articulated in Zauderer apply more broadly to factual and uncontroversial
disclosures required to serve other government interests [than preventing
consumer deception].” 73
The D.C. Circuit Court in AMI ultimately decided that “[t]he language
with which Zauderer justified its approach, however, sweeps far more
broadly than the interest in remedying deception.” 74 The court was
persuaded by the Zauderer reasoning that “the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides, [and thus, a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 373–75 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in part).
760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 21.
AMI, 760 F.3d at 20–21; see 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012).
See AMI, 760 F.3d at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
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company’s] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any
particular factual information in [its] advertising is minimal.” 75 The D.C.
Circuit Court in AMI followed its analysis by expressly overruling any
cases within its circuit that could be interpreted to hold that Zauderer is
limited to cases in which the justifying government interest is consumer
deception. 76
In short, under AMI’s reformulated and clarified version of the Zauderer
standard, any government-compelled commercial disclosure of “purely
factual and uncontroversial information” renders the speaker’s interest in
withholding such information “minimal.” 77
B. Petition for Rehearing Granted
AMI’s restated rule cast doubt upon whether Zauderer’s rational basis
standard should apply to the Conflict Minerals Rule,78 just as Judge
Srinivasan predicted in his dissent to the court of appeals’ prior ruling. 79
After AMI decided that Zauderer could, in fact, be extended beyond the
consumer deception context, the D.C. Circuit Court granted the SEC’s
petition for rehearing in order to determine whether AMI’s formulation of
the Zauderer standard had any effect on its ruling in NAM II. 80 Specifically,
the NAM III court sought to decide whether AMI’s broad holding “reaches
compelled disclosures that are unconnected to advertising or product
labeling at the point of sale.” 81
Even though the AMI court ruled—in direct contrast to what the court of
appeals decided in NAM II—that the considerably more lenient Zauderer
standard could apply outside the context of preventing consumer deception,
that small window of hope was again quashed by the court of appeals on
rehearing. 82 The court held that requiring manufacturers dealing in conflict
minerals to publish on their websites whether their conflict minerals are
“DRC conflict free” violated the First Amendment. 83
75. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1984) (citation omitted).
76. AMI, 760 F.3d at 22.
77. Id. at 22–23 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
78. NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 519–20 (D.C. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 135252 (Nov. 9, 2015).
79. NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Srinivasan, J., concurring in part),
overruled by AMI, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
80. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 520-21.
81. Id. at 522.
82. See id. at 520–21.
83. Id. at 521–24.
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C. After AMI: The Court Again Finds that the Conflict Minerals Rule
Violates the First Amendment
After a second round of considering the Manufacturers’ challenge to the
SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld its prior
ruling, albeit for slightly different reasons. The court again refused to apply
the Zauderer standard to the Conflicts Mineral Rule. 84 Although AMI
allows applying rational basis review outside the context of consumer
deception, the NAM III court found that the Zauderer standard is confined
to advertising, “emphatically and, one may infer, intentionally.”85 The court
emphasized Zauderer’s language that AMI relied upon, holding that “[the
advertiser's] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any
particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.” 86 In justifying
its position, the court cited several Supreme Court decisions in which the
Court likewise refused to apply Zauderer outside the context of voluntary
advertising. 87 In application to the Conflict Minerals Rule, the court found
that the required publishing of SEC disclosure material is not within the
purview of even the broadened Zauderer standard. The court relied upon
the SEC’s language in its Final Conflict Minerals Rule, which stated that
the disclosure regime “[was] ‘directed at achieving overall social benefits,’
that the law was not ‘intended to generate measurable, direct economic
benefits to investors or issuers,’ and that the regulatory requirements were
‘quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits that our
rules ordinarily strive to achieve.’” 88 The court of appeals interpreted this
language as a concession from the SEC that the case is unrelated to
advertising or point of sale disclosures. 89
Because the court of appeals decided that Zauderer did not apply to this
case, Central Hudson would be the proper standard to follow. However,
instead of renewing its analysis into whether the Conflict Minerals Rule
withstands Central Hudson, the court quickly and simply repeated the
reasoning it articulated prior to rehearing, that “the SEC's ‘final rule does

84. Id. at 523–24.
85. Id. at 522.
86. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1984) (second emphasis added).
87. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 522–23.
88. Id. at 522 (quoting Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350 (Sept. 12, 2012)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, & 249b)).
89. Id. at 522.
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not survive even Central Hudson's intermediate standard.’”90 The Rule was
thus found to be an unconstitutional violation of companies’ First
Amendment rights. 91
However, because the court of appeals was sensitive to the “flux and
uncertainty of the First Amendment doctrine of commercial speech,” the
court decided to buttress its holding with an alternate ground for finding
that the Conflict Minerals Rule violates the First Amendment. 92 The court
stated that “[e]ven if the compelled disclosures here are commercial speech
and even if AMI's view of Zauderer governed the analysis, we still believe
that the statute and the regulations violate the First Amendment.”93 The
court enunciated that the first step in evaluating the constitutional validity
of compelled commercial disclosures is to evaluate the adequacy of the
governmental interest motivating the rule.94 The court summarily accepted
the SEC’s stated objective of “ameliorat[ing] the humanitarian crisis in the
DRC,” and moved on to the second step of AMI’s test: evaluating the
effectiveness of the government’s measure in achieving the interest.95 In
reviewing efficacy of congressional initiatives, particularly in the arena of
foreign relations, courts recognize that the political branches possess a
greater degree of expertise and understanding on such matters, requiring
courts to allow a degree of deference to the judgment of Congress. 96 Based
on this reality, in the area of foreign relations, courts’ “conclusions must
often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence.”97
Although the court in this case accepted that mere evidence of the
government’s reasoning and judgment could demonstrate this efficacy, it
found that the SEC’s efficacy argument did not even rise above the level of
“speculation or conjecture.” 98 The court found the SEC’s argument purely
speculative despite the fact that the SEC produced statements by multiple
members of Congress and the executive branch, evidence of congressional

90. Id. at 524 (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI,
760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 524–26 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 26, NAM III, 800
F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5252)).
96. Id. at 525; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–36 (2010).
97. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 525 (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 34–35).
98. Id. at 525–26.
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hearings on the subject, and a United Nations Resolution. 99 The court
summarily found this evidence insufficient, and bolstered its finding with
evidence collected after the Conflict Minerals Rule was enacted, suggesting
that the implementation of section 1502 may cause unintended aggravating
effects on the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. 100 Ultimately, the court
decided that even though the SEC’s stated government interest passed
intermediate scrutiny, the SEC failed to prove the efficacy of the measure to
the degree required under the First Amendment to compel speech.101
Although the court decided that the SEC’s failure to demonstrate that the
Conflict Minerals Rule would in fact alleviate the DRC crisis alone would
doom the rule to unconstitutionality, the court chose to further find that, if it
were to continue its analysis under AMI’s test, the Conflict Minerals Rule
would again fail because the compelled disclosures do not represent “purely
factual and uncontroversial" information.102 The court recognized that the
AMI court “made no attempt to define those terms precisely.” 103 Despite its
uncertainty as to what “uncontroversial” could mean as it relates to
commercial disclosures, the court simply quoted its own language from its
prior ruling in deciding that “the description at issue—whether a product is
‘conflict free’ or ‘not conflict free’—was hardly ‘factual and nonideological.’” 104 The court went on to say: “We put it this way: ‘Products
and minerals do not fight conflicts. The label “[not] conflict free” is a
metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires
an issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if
they only indirectly finance armed groups.’”105
The D.C. Circuit Court essentially rested its decision that the Conflict
Minerals Rule’s requirement that companies publish on their websites
whether or not their conflict minerals have been found to be “DRC conflict
free” violates the First Amendment on two findings: (1) section 1502 and
the Conflicts Mineral Rule were not supported by sufficient empirical

99. Id.; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (explaining that, in
justifying a restriction on commercial speech, the government cannot rest on “mere
speculation or conjecture”).
100. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 526.
101. Id. at 527.
102. Id. at 527–30 (quoting AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
103. Id. at 528 (quoting Supplemental Brief for Intervenors at 9, NAM III, 800 F.3d 518
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5252)).
104. Id. at 530 (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
105. Id. (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d at 371).
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evidence of efficacy in achieving its goal, and (2) the required disclosure
does not constitute factual, uncontroversial information. 106
The dissent also engaged in a full analysis of the NAM III case, but came
to differing conclusions at several key junctures. First, the dissent would
have found that the relaxed Zauderer standard applied to section 1502 and
the Conflict Minerals Rule. 107 Upon finding no indication in Zauderer or
the Supreme Court decisions following Zauderer that the relaxed standard
was meant to only apply in advertising and product labels,108 the dissent
concluded that Zauderer rightfully applies to compelled government
disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial information. 109 The dissent
then took up the task of interpreting the proper meaning of “purely factual
and uncontroversial” from the AMI decision, and was careful to note that
the phrase “comes from a judicial opinion, not a statute. And the ‘language
of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with
language of a statute.’” 110 The dissent ultimately found that the labels
“DRC conflict free” or “not been found to be 'DRC conflict free'” are
merely terms of art defined by statute that do nothing more than convey
factual information about a particular product’s source. 111 The additional
fact that the Rule allows companies the flexibility to explain the context and
meaning of the term on their websites makes it unlikely that consumers
would be misled into believing that the company had essentially
“confess[ed] blood on its hands,” 112 as the majority argued. Thus, in the
dissent’s view, section 1502 and the Conflict Minerals Rule would properly
fall under the purview of the lax Zauderer standard and pass constitutional
scrutiny. 113
However, perhaps following the majority’s lead, the dissent refused to
stop its analysis here; the dissent went on to argue that even if the more
demanding Central Hudson test were to apply in this case, section 1502 and
the Conflict Minerals Rule would still pass constitutional muster. 114
Because the parties were in general agreement that promoting peace and
security in the DRC region qualifies as a substantial interest, 115 the dissent
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 526, 530.
Id. at 534–36 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)).
Id. at 538–39.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id. at 542.
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went on to find that there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that
section 1502 and the Conflict Minerals Rule reasonably further the SEC’s
aims. 116 The dissent reemphasized that because “[p]redictive judgments
about matters such as the overseas trade in conflict minerals lie uniquely
within the expertise of Congress and the Executive,” the Supreme Court
“stressed the need to respect such judgments.” 117 It was inappropriate for
the majority to rely on post hoc evidence tending to disprove the efficacy of
the Rule, because the proper frame of reference for deciding a statute’s
constitutionality ought to relate to the time when the statute was passed.
The dissent states:
Whatever may be the actual effect of the statute and Rule—
including the possibility that they may have had unanticipated
consequences—their constitutionality would not turn on a post
hoc referendum on their effectiveness at a particular point in
time. Otherwise, a law's constitutionality might wax and wane
depending on the precise time when its validity is assessed.118
NAM III was wrongly decided. The dissent aptly notes all of the
weaknesses in the majority’s decision, and each of these weaknesses prove
fatal to the holding that the Conflict Minerals Rule violates the First
Amendment. The decision creates a chilling effect on corporate
transparency and contributes further to the already widespread uncertainty
surrounding compelled commercial speech.
IV. Why the National Association of Manufacturers Case
Was Wrongly Decided
A. Importance of the National Association of Manufacturers Decision
The NAM III decision will have a major effect on consumers,
manufacturers, and regulatory disclosure schemes as a whole. Consumers
are increasingly demanding corporate transparency, 119 and this decision

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.
See NIELSEN, DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD: INCREASINGLY, CONSUMERS CARE
ABOUT CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, BUT DOES CONCERN CONVERT TO
CONSUMPTION? 5 (June 2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/nielsenglobal/jp/docs/
report/2014/Nielsen%20Global%20Corporate%20Social%20Responsibility%20Report%20%20June%202014.pdf; see also American Consumers Take Sustainability to the Next Level,
TORK (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.torkusa.com/about/press-releases/news-detail?id=10863
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presents a major obstacle for consumers’ ability to gather information about
their products. Consumer perception of a company’s transparency has been
linked to willingness to purchase that company’s product and to spread
positive opinions about the company. 120 A recent study shows that fifty-five
percent of consumers are willing to pay more money for sustainable
products. 121 Perhaps unsurprisingly, sixty percent of those consumers are
under thirty-four years old, 122 demonstrating that this trend is only likely to
continue growing. Increased access to information allows consumers and
investors to put pressure on companies to make ethical sourcing decisions.
The Conflict Minerals Rule allows consumers to decide for themselves
whether they want to participate in financing the atrocities in the DRC.
Beyond the consumer interest in access to product information, the
United States is committed to holding its companies to a high standard of
corporate transparency, and the NAM III ruling stands in plain contradiction
to U.S. policy on the topic of business and human rights. In 2013, the U.S.
Department of State published a document titled U.S. Government
Approach to Business and Human Rights. 123 The document expressly
endorses the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 124
which encourage companies to engage in extensive due diligence activities
and to report the outcomes of those activities on their public websites.125 In
this 2013 guidance, the government clarified that the UN Guiding
Principles are meant to be understood as the base level of responsibility and
transparency that U.S. companies are expected to practice, and encouraged
U.S. companies to strive beyond the recommendations of the UN Guiding

(stating that seventy-eight percent of consumers said they purchase sustainable products,
compared to seventy-five percent in 2014).
120. Jiyun Kang & Gwendolyn Hustvedt, Building Trust Between Consumers and
Corporations: The Role of Consumer Perceptions of Transparency and Social
Responsibility, 125 J. BUS. ETHICS 253, 262 (2013).
121. NIELSEN, supra note 119, at 5.
122. Id. at 8.
123. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S.
GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), https://www.
humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/usg-approach-on-business-and-human-rightsupdatedjune2013.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS].
124. Id. at 3–5.
125. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General), Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. DocA/HRC/17/31, at 17-18, 20 (Mar. 21, 2011).
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Principles. 126 In further commitment to this goal of corporate responsibility,
the U.S. government is currently in the process of developing a National
Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct.127 The National Action Plan
is centered upon the effort “to promote and incentivize responsible business
conduct . . . with respect to transparency.” 128 U.S. government policy is
clearly trending toward increased corporate transparency and disclosure.
The NAM III ruling protecting companies’ ability to withhold the results of
the due diligence efforts already required by the government presents a
major obstruction in the operation of U.S. policy on business and human
rights.
On a practical level, the D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling means that the
commercial disclosures required of manufacturers in some states may be
reviewed under different standards than those used for manufacturers in
others. 129 Circuit courts continue to grapple with when to apply the
Zauderer standard, and what standard to apply if the court finds the
Zauderer standard inapplicable, creating a circuit split on how to review
compelled commercial speech.130 While the Second Circuit is willing to
apply the relaxed Zauderer standard even when the prevention of consumer
deception is not at issue,131 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that,
when the case does not fit into the Zauderer exception, the court is to apply
strict scrutiny. 132 NAM III has added even greater uncertainty to the already
vague arena of compelled disclosures, producing a nearly impenetrable
minefield of law under which manufacturers must operate.

126. U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 123, at
4.
127. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: The U.S. Global
Anticorruption Agenda (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
09/24/fact-sheet-us-global-anticorruption-agenda.
128. Id.
129. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2012); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).
130. Joshua A. Feinzeig, Promoting World Peace Through the Use of the “Good Book”:
Implementing Foreign Policy Through the Tax Code, 40 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 953, 972–73
(2015).
131. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
132. Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 554 (“If a commercial-speech disclosure
requirement fits within the framework of Zauderer and its progeny, then we apply a rationalbasis standard. If it does not, then we treat the disclosure as compelled speech under Wooley
v. Maynard and its ilk and apply strict scrutiny.” (citations omitted)); Entm’t Software Ass’n,
469 F.3d at 651-52 (applying strict scrutiny when video labeling requirements were found
outside to be outside of the Zauderer exception).
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Further, this decision casts doubt on a number of other long-accepted
disclosure regimes across industries. 133 Employers must notify employees
of potential workplace hazards. 134 Automobile manufacturers must provide
labels for their cars containing information on fuel consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions. 135 Health care providers must inform patients of
their privacy rights. 136 Mortgage brokers must make disclosures regarding
loan terms and fees to borrowers. 137 Home lenders must make public
information regarding the race, national origin, sex, and incomes of
applicants and actual borrowers. 138 Credit companies are required to
disclose information about card rates, fees, and balances to cardholders. 139
Because none of these disclosures involve advertising or point of sale
disclosures, the NAM III court would review their constitutional legitimacy
under the Central Hudson standard. 140 The Central Hudson test, though
labeled as intermediate scrutiny, has been applied with such vigor that no
government restriction of commercial speech has survived its review in
over two decades. 141
The implications of the NAM III decision are severe, both on consumer
interests and U.S. policy, as well as on the current regulatory disclosure
regime.
B. The D.C. Circuit Court’s Flawed Analysis
The NAM III majority rested its decision on three findings—each of
which are inadequate. First, the court found that Zauderer is limited to
voluntary advertising or point of purchase sales, despite scant evidence that
the Zauderer Court intended such a narrow interpretation of its rule.
Second, the court decided that the government’s inability to prove that the
Rule would actually alleviate the DRC crisis doomed section 1502 and the
Conflict Minerals Rule to unconstitutionality. Finally, the court did not find
133. Brief of Amici Curiae Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. in Support of
Appellees' Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 2–3, NAM III, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(No. 13-5252), 2015 WL 5996680.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (2012).
135. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 (2015).
136. See 45 id. § 164.520.
137. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2606 (2012).
138. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (2012).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637a (2012).
140. See NAM III, 800 F.3d 518, 521–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, No. 135252 (Nov. 9, 2015).
141. Seth E. Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The First Amendment and Public Health, at
Odds, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 298, 299 n.12 (2013).
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the labels “DRC conflict free” and “not been found to be DRC conflict
free” to convey purely factual and uncontroversial information.
1. Zauderer Is Not Limited to Voluntary Advertising
The NAM III court rested its holding upon a clear limitation of the
Zauderer standard to instances of voluntary advertising or point of sale
disclosures. 142 This limitation, however, conflicts both with the Zauderer
Court’s core rationale as well as with the interpretations of other circuit
courts. 143
Zauderer expressly presents itself as a decision on commercial speech. 144
The Zauderer Court placed a lax standard of constitutional review on
commercial speech because a company has a minimal interest in
withholding factual information about its products when weighed against
the value such disclosure provides consumers. 145 This stated reasoning for
slackening the level of review is hardly unique to the advertising context; a
company’s interest in withholding valuable information from its consumers
should be found minimal irrespective of how the disclosure presents itself.
The majority relied heavily on quotations from Zauderer using the word
“advertising,” 146 but the majority fails to acknowledge that the use of the
word is attributable more to the specific factual scenario of Zauderer
(upholding a state requirement that attorneys’ advertising services must
provide certain disclosures about fees to potential clients) than to any
intentional limitation on the Zauderer Court’s part to the context of
voluntary advertising. 147
This reading of Zauderer’s holding is shared by at least one other circuit
court, and has never been refuted by the Supreme Court.148 In United States
v. Wenger, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a requirement
compelling radio program hosts to disclose information about payments
made to encourage certain opinions, in the interest of providing listeners
with knowledge of whether the hosts’ statements are truly disinterested. 149
This kind of disclosure is hardly related to advertising and certainly has
142. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 521–22.
143. Id. at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
144. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 637 (1985).
145. Id. at 650–53.
146. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 522.
147. See id. at 536 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
148. United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849 (10th Cir. 2005); see NAM III, 800 F.3d
at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
149. 427 F.3d at 850–51.
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nothing to do with point of sale disclosures. The Supreme Court has also
never intimated that such a limitation would be warranted in its postZauderer decisions on commercial speech.150
Moreover, the majority’s limitation of relaxed scrutiny to commercial
advertising yields incongruous results. As Judge Srinivasan appropriately
notes in his dissent, if the Conflict Minerals Rule had required
manufacturers to place prominent labels regarding country of origin directly
onto their products, the majority would review such point of sale
disclosures under rational basis. 151 Yet when that same disclosure is
required to be placed once yearly on the company’s website, explained by
any contextualizing information the company may choose to include, a
more demanding standard of review would be necessary. 152 Why should a
periodic internet post be more harshly scrutinized than a prominent product
label? This result is especially illogical considering that, when presented
with the choice, most manufacturers would almost certainly favor an
internet posting over product label disclosures. The majority opinion does
little to assuage its holding’s discordant consequences, further suggesting
that the majority framework should not stand.
2. The Government Is Not Required to Prove Actual Effectiveness of the
Conflict Minerals Rule
The NAM III court’s alternate holding, that, even under rational basis
scrutiny, the SEC failed to demonstrate the actual effectiveness of the
Conflict Minerals Rule, is equally as flawed as its first holding. The court
demanded much stronger proof of efficacy than is actually required, failed
to adequately defer to the executive branch’s judgment in foreign relations,
inappropriately relied on post-hoc evidence, and created an efficacy
standard that would topple some of the most widely accepted disclosure
regimes.

150. The majority cites a number of cases to prove that the Supreme Court would
approve of an advertising limit. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 523. However, these cases were
merely restating the holding of Zauderer, not expressing an intent to limit the scope of
Zauderer’s holding. See Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Zauderer's observation that the government may at times
“prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” in a case not involving
commercial speech (citation omitted)); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,
416 (2001) (reciting the holding of Zauderer upon its facts, but giving no indication that
Zauderer was meant to be confined to the advertising context).
151. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 535 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
152. See id.
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The court overstated the level of proof required under the second prong
of Zauderer constitutional scrutiny. The majority claimed to be following
AMI’s formulation of the Zauderer standard, under which the court
evaluates the effectiveness of the measure in achieving its goal. However,
the AMI court actually evaluated effectiveness very loosely; the court stated
that actual evidence of a regulation’s effectiveness is not required,
reasoning that “such evidentiary parsing is hardly necessary when the
government uses a disclosure mandate to achieve a goal of informing
consumers about a particular product trait, assuming of course that the
reason for informing consumers qualifies as an adequate interest.” 153 AMI
went so far as to say that a reasonably crafted government mandate to
disclose certain facts about attributes of a company’s product “will almost
always demonstrate a reasonable means-ends relationship.” 154 The NAM III
majority, however, made no attempt to differentiate between a country of
origin label for meat products that will always satisfy rational basis
scrutiny, and a country of origin website posting for electronic products that
the court deemed to fail rational basis scrutiny on this count.155
Beyond the AMI context, cases in the field of foreign relations call for an
even lower standard for demonstrating effectiveness, as the court is to defer
to the executive branch’s judgment regarding the effectiveness of a
particular rule. 156 Given the courts’ lack of expertise in foreign affairs, and
the difficulty with which the effectiveness of foreign affairs measures can
be evaluated, courts’ “conclusions must often be based on informed
judgment rather than concrete evidence.”157 While the NAM III majority
gave lip service to the Supreme Court precedent mandating deference to the
executive branch’s factual conclusions, the court quickly dismissed the
SEC’s proffered conclusions as “rest[ing] on pure speculation,” and
creating “evidentiary gaps.” 158

153. AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)).
154. Id.
155. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 524–27.
156. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-36 (2010).
157. Id. at 34-35; see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62 (1973); United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954) (making no inquiry into whether the legislative
record supported the determination that the regulation would be effective); Nat’l Ass’n of
Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (allowing a “value judgment based on
the common sense of the people's representatives” to support required disclosure of
contributions to lobbying activities).
158. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 525.
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The importance of reducing funding to the armed conflict in the DRC
has long been a source of concern, both in the U.S. and internationally. 159
The SEC provided citations to multiple sources bolstering its conclusion
that reducing funding to armed groups would promote peace and security in
the DRC. 160 Under scrutiny that has demanded no actual evidence of
effectiveness, 161 and given the deference accorded in the realm of foreign
relations, 162 the government’s evidence of its rational, factual conclusion
that section 1502 would serve its purpose should have more than satisfied
the extremely low burden for demonstrating efficacy.
Further, the majority’s attempt to bolster its determination that the
Conflict Minerals Rule is ineffective with evidence that its enactment has
had unintended consequences is entirely misplaced. With regard to whether
Congress adequately determined that its rule would be effective at
promoting its goal, evidence of unintended effects of the rule after its
passing is wholly irrelevant. As Judge Srinivasan noted, ”[o]therwise, a
law's constitutionality might wax and wane depending on the precise time
when its validity is assessed.” 163 The majority’s evidence also fails to tell
the whole story; in addition to the reports of section 1502’s unintended
consequences, other reports exist proclaiming that the rule has actually had
a hugely successful impact on the ground.164 While evidence of later-intime ineffectiveness may be successful in tarnishing the reputation of
section 1502, it provides no insight into the constitutionality of the rule at
the time it was passed.
159. See 155 CONG. REC. S4697-98 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Feingold); S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8 (Nov. 9, 2001) (stressing that “the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo should not be exploited to finance the conflict in that
country”); Karen E. Woody, Securities Laws as Foreign Policy, 15 NEV. L.J. 297, 315–17
(2014).
160. See 156 CONG. REC. S3976 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(accepting the UN’s determination that militant groups are able to finance themselves by
controlling mines and trade routes and referring to section 1502 as “a significant, practical
step toward” addressing the underlying cause of the conflict); 156 CONG. REC. S3817 (daily
ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 155 CONG. REC. S4697-98 (daily ed. Apr. 23,
2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold); Press Statement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
Conflict Minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2010/994 (July 22, 2010),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145039.htm.
161. AMI, 760 F.3d 18, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
162. Holder, 561 U.S. at 33-35.
163. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 545 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
164. Nicholas Webb et al., Conflict Minerals and the Law, BENCH & B. MINN., Jan. 2015,
at 26, 28–29 (providing evidence that Dodd-Frank Section 1502 has had a hugely successful
impact upon ameliorating the situation in the DRC).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

542

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:519

Finally, the level of effectiveness required by the majority raises the
standard for proof-of-effectiveness above what even the most commonplace
disclosures can provide. The amicus brief filed by the Tobacco Control
Legal Consortium and numerous other organizations argues that mandated
warnings regarding allergens in food, safety of children’s toys, and side
effects of prescription drugs would almost certainly fail to “survive a
similar ex ante demand for proof of effectiveness.” 165 In the face of
precedent suggesting that little to no evidence should be required,166 the
majority essentially required proof of actual effectiveness of the SEC’s
rule, creating an untenable standard under which even the most basic
disclosure requirements would fall.
3. The Conflict Minerals Rule’s Labels Constitute Purely Factual and
Uncontroversial Information
The NAM III majority’s final blow to the Conflict Minerals Rule—that
the disclosures required do not represent purely factual or uncontroversial
information—can also be negated. Even though the majority engaged in
some discussion as to the actual requirements of Zauderer’s “purely factual
and uncontroversial” holding, the court ultimately leaned on its prior
decision that the disclosures are “hardly ‘factual and non-ideological,’” in
that they “compel[] an issuer to confess blood on its hands.” 167
The Conflict Minerals Rule’s label “DRC conflict free” does not require
companies to confess blood on their hands, as the phrase is merely a
statutorily defined term of art. Section 1502 defines “DRC conflict free” to
mean that the reporting company’s necessary minerals do not directly or
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the DRC or an adjoining
country. 168 It is difficult to see how this factual information regarding
conflict sourcing could be materially different from those sourcing
disclosures required in AMI; as the dissent notes, “[i]f geographic
information about the sourcing of meat products qualifies as ‘purely factual
and uncontroversial,’ as we held in AMI, so, too, does geographic
information about the sourcing of a product's component minerals.”169 It is
highly unlikely that these disclosures would mislead consumers, especially
165. Brief of Amici Curiae Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al. In Support of
Appellees' Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 133, at 5.
166. See AMI, 760 F.3d at 26; Holder, 561 U.S. at 34-35.
167. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 530.
168. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii), (D) (2012).
169. NAM III, 800 F.3d at 539 (citation omitted) (quoting AMI, 760 F.3d at 27).
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considering the fact that companies are allowed to surround their disclosure
with any contextualizing information they deem fit.170
A recent study shows that the vast majority of consumers find section
1502’s conflict minerals labels to convey purely factual information. This
survey found that eighty-six percent of consumers polled thought that the
conflict minerals disclosures to convey purely factual information.171 This
margin is strikingly close to the ninety-seven percent of consumers who
believed that country of origin product labeling—of the type that passed
AMI scrutiny with ease—to be purely factual. 172 If the major concern is that
the label “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free’” will mislead
consumers into believing a company has moral culpability for the DRC
crisis, 173 this information demonstrates that such fears are largely
unwarranted.
Because the Conflict Minerals Rule’s labels are statutorily defined terms
of art, presented within the context of the company’s explanation of their
meaning, and because consumers actually believe the disclosures to convey
factual information, the majority’s conclusory statement that these
disclosures “compel[] an issuer to confess blood on its hands” 174 cannot
stand.
V. Conclusion
As the purchaser of a brand new smartphone, are you satisfied with the
conclusion of the NAM III court? Does it make sense to you that the product
labeling of the meat you purchase will be scrutinized less harshly than the
websites you view in your search for reliable information? The D.C. Circuit
Court has presented a major step backward in the ever-growing trend of
corporate transparency. The court improperly limited the scope of rational
basis review of commercial speech, it overstated the level of effectiveness
the government is required to prove in matters of foreign affairs, and it
deemed the Conflict Minerals Rule’s disclosures “hardly” factual and
uncontroversial with a brief conclusory statement. Each of these mistakes
led the court to exacerbate an already unsound legal scheme that puts the
170. Id.
171. Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe, Stubborn Things: An Empirical Approach to Facts,
Opinions, and the First Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 47, 56 (2015),
http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=mlr_fi.
172. Id.
173. See NAM III, 800 F.3d at 530.
174. Id. (quoting NAM II, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by AMI, 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
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review of disclosure regimes across industries in question. These missteps
doom the decision to unconstitutionality.
The confounding narrative over levels of scrutiny, compelled
commercial speech, and the Conflict Minerals Rule only distracts from the
true purpose of these disclosures: to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in
the DRC by encouraging U.S. companies to abstain from indirectly funding
militant groups. Outside of the legal battle, thousands of miles away, the
crisis still rages on in the DRC, and U.S. consumers deserve to know
whether or not they are contributing to its perpetuation.
Emma Land
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